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ARTICLE
SOVEREIGNTY AS A BRAKE ON
NATIONALISM
JEREMY RABKIN*
Even before the coronavirus pandemic, there were loud protests
against “globalism” or “globalization”—terms that seemed to denote (to
critics) the erasure of national boundaries. Such protests were often charac-
terized as “nationalist.” Sometimes they were described as protests against
“threats to national sovereignty.”
The rhetoric might seem interchangeable—as between appeals to “na-
tionalism” and appeals to defend “sovereignty.” So, when he addressed the
UN General Assembly in September of 2017, President Trump used the
term “sovereign” or “sovereignty” a total of twenty-one times in a speech of
fifteen pages.1 In a later statement, President Trump said, “I’m a national-
ist.”2 The terms seemed aimed at the same political constituencies. They
may appeal to similar feelings or inclinations. At first blush, they aim at the
same result—blocking internationalist or “globalist” projects.
But they are not quite the same, and it is not mere pedantry to empha-
size their different implications. In what follows, part I sketches the differ-
ent origins and associations of these political terms. Part II develops the
claim that since the beginning of the current century, sovereignty has had
more force than nationalism. Part III argues that regard for sovereignty may
help to tame or redirect nationalist feeling in helpful ways.
I. DIFFERENT ORIGINS
Sovereignty was the bright new idea of the sixteenth century, national-
ism of the nineteenth century. The French term souverain was used in medi-
eval times to designate a high level of authority, and variants were
* Jeremy Rabkin is a professor at Scalia Law School of George Mason University. He has
written extensively about the history of legal debates on sovereignty.
1. Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN IT. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://it.usembassy.gov/remarks-presi-
dent-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly.
2. Peter Baker, ‘Use That Word!’: Trump Embraces the ‘Nationalist’ Label, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2018, at 1.
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sometimes deployed by English writers in that sense. The Oxford English
Dictionary attributes the first use of “sovereignty” to a poem written in
1378 by Geoffrey Chaucer where a woman rejects her suitor’s claim to the
“sovereignete [o]f me in love.”3
But the first work to discuss souveraineté as a precise political term
was a treatise of the French jurist Jean Bodin, Six Livres de la Republique,
which first appeared (in French) in 1576.4 It devoted an entire chapter to
explaining the attributes (marques) that distinguished “sovereignty” from
lesser forms of authority.5 Bodin’s treatise—though many hundreds of
pages—was translated into English and published in its entirety at the out-
set of the seventeenth century.6 “Sovereignty”—in its political sense—then
became a staple among such prominent seventeenth-century political think-
ers as the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, the German diplomat Samuel
Pufendorf, and the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.7
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first work to use the
term “nationalism” in English was published in 1798. It was a translation of
a four-volume work by the exiled French Jesuit priest Augustin Barruel that
had first appeared (in French) only the year before. As late as 1797, Barruel
thought it necessary to explain what he meant by the term, defining it as the
“love of a particular nation to the exclusion of others.”8
So the arrival of these terms into general usage among political com-
mentators was separated by two hundred years or more. That was not by
happenstance. These different terms addressed the very different challenges
of the eras in which they entered into general usage.
Sovereignty responded to concerns that arose out of political conflicts
that displaced the political order of medieval Europe. Under the feudal ar-
rangements of that era, local lords held land in return for a pledge of fealty
to some higher lord, who usually held his lands on pledge of fealty to a still
higher lord, and so on up to the prince or king of the realm. It was generally
thought that even a regional overlord owed some vague (and often disputed)
3. “Ye shal namore han sovereignete [o]f me in love.” GEOFFREY CHAUCER, TROILUS AND
CRISEYDE bk. III, l, at 171 (R.A. Shoaf ed., Colleagues Press 1989) (1374).
4. The treatise was reprinted by Fayard (Paris, 1986) in six volumes corresponding to the
original six “livres.” JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (Christiane Frémont et al.
eds., Fayard 1986) (1576).
5. The list of indicators of sovereign power persuaded later generations or has intuitive
logic. Every one of these marks of sovereignty—such as coining money—was assigned to the
federal government in the US Constitution. Id. at liv. I, ch. 10.
6. JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Rich-
ard Knolles trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1606).
7. Most notably: HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 58–68 (Louise R. Loomis
trans., Walter J. Black 1949) (1625) (“Wars of Subjects versus their Superiors”); THOMAS HOB-
BES, LEVIATHAN 133–41 (1651) (“Of the Rights of Soveraignes by Institution”); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE 214–20 (Ian
Hunter & David Saunders eds., Andrew Tooke trans., Liberty Fund 2003) (1673).
8. AUGUSTIN BARRUEL, MEMOIRS ILLUSTRATING THE HISTORY OF JACOBINISM 181 (Robert
Clifford trans., 1799) (1797).
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deference in turn to the pope, as the spiritual lord of western Christendom,
and to the Holy Roman Emperor, the highest temporal authority in Chris-
tendom and thus (as often envisioned) a kind of counterpart to papal author-
ity. “Sovereignty” became an important idea when, beginning in the
sixteenth century, Protestant princes sought to assert their primacy against
popes or emperors outside their own realm, and against local lords who
might invoke such outside authorities to justify their own resistance or re-
bellions at home.9
You can see the point from the evolution of a parallel term. In medie-
val times, the term “majestas” was reserved for the Holy Roman Emperor in
acknowledgement of his status as the very highest authority. That did not
mean, however, that he actually had reliable governing control over all the
lands vaguely associated with his empire (or with Christendom). England’s
Henry VIII seems to have been the first local monarch to appropriate the
term “majestas” for himself, insisting that his realm was its own, entirely
free-standing “empire.”10 A few decades later, Bodin used the term “majes-
tas” as the Latin counterpart of “sovereignty”—that is, a generic term—
when he translated his treatise into Latin. The word was used in that sense
(as a generic political status for independent monarchs) in the treatise of
Grotius in the early seventeenth century. A century later it had become stan-
dard to address independent monarchs as “Your Majesty” as the new idea
expressed by this term came to be generally accepted.
“Sovereignty” was a crucial term when the independent governing au-
thority of rulers was still much in dispute. But independent authority did not
mean “national authority.” The nation was a vague concept in medieval
Europe, even in early modern Europe, because kings often ruled over very
different peoples dispersed in various territorial holdings, not always con-
tiguous.11 The kings of England (initially French-speaking Normans them-
selves) spent a hundred years fighting (and finally failing) to make good
their claims to rule France between the mid-fourteenth and mid-fifteenth
centuries. In the following century, Spanish and French kings battled for
control of vast chunks of today’s Italy as well as today’s Belgium and Hol-
land. Shakespeare had a good deal of fun with “ethnic” characters—the
Welshman, Scotsman, Irishman, etc.—he depicted in the medieval army of
Henry V on the eve of a battle in 1415, but writing nearly two hundred
9. For classic accounts, see CHARLES MCILLWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN
THE WEST (1932); ALEXANDER PASSERIN D’ENTRÈVES, THE NOTION OF THE STATE (1967).
10. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE 84 (1999).
11. Even in the early seventeenth century, it could be said, “the dynasty was, with few excep-
tions, more important in European diplomacy than the nation. Royal marriages were the rivets of
international policy . . . . For all practical purposes France and Spain are misleading terms for the
dynasties of Bourbon and Hapsburg.” C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 18 (N.Y. Rev.
Books 2005) (1938).
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years later, he took for granted that these various “nationalities” would
serve willingly under an English king.12
“Nationalism” became a challenge or an attraction when attention
shifted from the ruler to the subjects—now conceived as “citizens” whose
consent to rule was beginning to be considered requisite to legitimate politi-
cal authority. The French Revolution brought the nation to the center of
attention when it ended the centuries-old authority of the monarchy and
replaced the centuries-old gathering of “Estates” (nobility, bishops, and
commoners) with a “National Assembly.”13 The appeal to “the people” was
joined with an appeal to “the nation”—as in the Declaration of the Rights of
Man: “sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.”14
Not by coincidence, the French Revolution dissolved the historic prov-
inces of France, along with provincial courts and laws, to establish a single,
centralized republic. Later, Napoleon became a great sponsor of national
confederations in northern Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland in
the expectation that these French impositions would have more local, popu-
lar support if cast as “national” entities, supplanting ramshackle medieval
holdovers. It was in the midst of this restructuring that Habsburg emperors
renounced the lingering idea of a “Holy Roman Empire,” even as a ceremo-
nial holding company for German states. Then it turned out that Napoleon’s
enemies—in Portugal and Spain, in Prussia and the Netherlands, even in
Russia —could appeal to national feeling as a force against French
impositions.15
12. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3 sc. 2, l. 139–42 (Henry N. Hudson et al.
eds., Grosset & Dunlap 1909) (1600) for banter among English Captain Gower, Welsh Captain
Fluellen, Irish Captain Macmorris, Scots Captain Jamy: Macmorris: “What ish [sic] my nation?
. . . Who talks of my nation?” It is not explained why there is a Scot in the mix, since Scotland
was an independent kingdom at the time of Henry’s war, as dialogue in the play acknowledges. Id.
at act 1 sc. 2, l. 145–46 (“But fear the main intendment of the Scot, [w]ho hath been still a giddy
neighbor to us[.]”). It may be that by the time Shakespeare wrote the play, he could expect his
audience to look forward to a merging of English and Scottish realms when Queen Elizabeth’s
crown passed to the King of Scotland, James VI (afterward James I of England). But the need to
soothe ethnic or regional rivalries corresponds to the effort of King Henry to supplant feudal rank
with national solidarity on the eve of battle. Id. at act 4 sc. 3, l. 61–63 (“For he to-day that sheds
his blood with me/ [s]hall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile [in social rank]/ This day shall gentle
his condition[.]”).
13. The American Revolution, though stressing “the consent of the governed” in the Declara-
tion of Independence of 1776, avoided talk about “the nation”: the war was declared by a Conti-
nental Congress (not a National Congress) and fought by a Continental Army (not a National
Army). It was still quite unsettled among the American colonies whether primary civic loyalty ran
to the individual state (Massachusetts, Virginia, etc.—each declared to be “sovereign” in the Arti-
cles of Confederation) or to the United States.
14. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, art. 3 (grounding the conclu-
sion that “[n]o body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly
from the nation”).
15. For the most recent retelling of these episodes, see ANDREW ROBERTS, NAPOLEON THE
GREAT 464–97, 580–608, 662–87 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-NOV-21 11:42
2021] SOVEREIGNTY AS A BRAKE ON NATIONALISM 615
Nationalism continued as a force, even after the defeat of Napoleon,
because foreign armies could not reestablish the stability of monarchies that
existed before the French Revolution. The revolution against the Bourbon
monarchy in France in 1830 coincided with revolutions against Dutch con-
trol of French speakers (or fellow Catholics) in what is now Belgium, a
Polish uprising against Russian rule, and the settlement of a long-running
revolt of Greeks against Turkish rule. There was a similar pattern among
revolutions of 1848—against monarchs such as the Austrian emperor, seen
as illegitimate for being undemocratic and as much (in some places) for
being foreign. Enterprising sovereigns in Prussia (initially a kingdom in the
northeast of German-speaking territory) and Savoy (in the northwestern
corner of the Italian peninsula) achieved “national unification” in the third
quarter of the nineteenth century. They did so by conquering neighboring
kingdoms in the name of bringing together “Germans” or “Italians” in one
“national state”—appealing, in effect, to peoples against their previous rul-
ers in the name of national solidarity.16
At the end of World War I, the collapse of the remaining European
empires—those ruled by the Austrian and German emperors, the Russian
czar, and the Ottoman sultan—brought the underlying problem into sharp
focus. The motto of Woodrow Wilson—“national self-determination”—
could be seen as a cry for democracy but equally (and not always compati-
bly) a call for redrawing borders to make each state a collection of people
who belonged to the same “nation.”17 The problem was that geography and
demography could not be made to run smoothly together, as governments
sought not only to encompass ethnic homogeneity but valuable resources or
defensible boundaries. Amid political tensions of the interwar period, na-
tionalism remained a rallying cry. Borders were redrawn under the sponsor-
ship of a triumphant Germany at the outset of the Second World War and
redrawn again at war’s end under Soviet sponsorship.
In sum, nationalism emerged as a mobilizing force in politics in the era
when politics seemed to turn on mobilizing popular support—the era of
democracy. It proposed an answer to a new question. Sovereignty has
sought to answer the question “Should we be ruled from here or from
there?” Or better, “Which government has the last word in political deci-
sions?” Nationalism presses a different question: “Which people should be
governed in common?” The questions pressed by “nationalists” were not
16. For concise accounts, highlighting disputes even among people within the emerging na-
tional states, see RICHARD J. EVANS, THE PURSUIT OF POWER 241–47, 249–65 (2017) (referencing
Italian unification and German unification respectively).
17. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919 11–15 (Random House 2002) (2001) (analyzing
Wilson’s own lack of clarity on the meaning of the term); id. at 109–24 (detailing the ensuing
disputes about its application to particular territories and peoples, notably what became Yugosla-
via); id. at 125–35 (Rumania); id. at 136–42 (Bulgaria); id. at 208–28 (Poland); id. at 229–43
(Czechoslovakia); id. at 257–70 (Hungary); id. at 347–80 (Greece and Turkey).
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pressing questions in the era when “sovereignty” was regarded as a suffi-
cient answer to the most pressing political questions.
Sovereignty and nationalism not only respond to different questions
but also offer different kinds of answers. Sovereignty, as a doctrine about
government, is more readily treated as a legal concept. Bodin, Grotius, and
Pufendorf were jurists whose works are still studied by legal scholars and
were still cited by courts many centuries after the works first appeared.18
Sovereignty is a very abstract doctrine that, from the beginning, has sought
to clarify what it is that defines the status of independent states. It addresses
what independent states have in common. The language of sovereignty can
be readily employed by very different kinds of government: whatever their
political differences, they are all independent states, so they share a com-
mon interest in defining the claims of independent states.
Nationalism is not a body of principles developed by lawyers. It is not
even developed by nationalists. An advocate for national sovereignty can
say, “We want to be sovereign as others are sovereign.” A nationalist pre-
sumably wants to say, “What we are is best, and we don’t care about
others.” So there are many famous old books that analyze and endorse “sov-
ereignty” but no comparable canon of famous works clarifying and endors-
ing “nationalism” as such. Authors have certainly celebrated their own
nations but not so much “nationalism” in the abstract. A recent book that
has received some attention, The Virtue of Nationalism, does not give sus-
tained attention to any old book—in spite of the fact that its author earned a
doctorate in political theory.19
We can conclude this initial survey by noting that international law, as
we now conceive it, first achieved wide acceptance in the era when political
thought focused on sovereignty. Grotius was long recognized as the “father
of international law” precisely because he reasoned about the implications
of a world of independent states, disregarding claims of the papacy or the
Holy Roman Emperor. Classical international law focused on standards de-
fining the rights and duties of sovereign states in their mutual interactions.
Contemporary international law still bears the marks of this origin—evident
18. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 797 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Bodin as “in
the line” of those advocating some version of sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 151 n.44 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This modern notion of sovereignty is
traceable to the writings of Jean Bodin[.]”); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953) (“the
high seas as to which the law was probably settled and old when Grotius wrote that it cannot be
anyone’s property”); Walker v. Villavaso, 73 U.S. 124, 126 (1867) (“Grotius, Puffendorf [sic],
and other writers on public law” do not support confiscation of civilian property in circumstances
here); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 120 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (refer-
encing Pufendorf treatise and Blackstone).
19. YORAM HAZONY, THE VIRTUE OF NATIONALISM (2018).
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in doctrines like “sovereign immunity” or “state consent” (that is, the con-
sent of sovereign states, rather than “nations” or “peoples”).20
We might say, then, that in the competition between sovereignty and
nationalism, sovereignty has had a long head start. Perhaps sovereignty fo-
cuses on issues that are more basic or fundamental. At any rate, nationalism
has not actually been catching up as an organizing force in world affairs. At
least, the trend in recent decades has not been toward more accommodation
of nationalism, while it has in many ways been toward accommodating (or
re-accommodating) sovereignty.
II. THE WORLD RESPECTS SOVEREIGNTY
To say much about the trajectory of nationalism in recent decades re-
quires some prior agreement on what that term encompasses. “Nationalism”
seems to have first been deployed as a term of abuse or at least of dispar-
agement: the nationalist is so devoted to his own nation that he disregards
the legitimate claims of others. But even critics of “nationalism” often ac-
knowledge that devotion to one’s own nation can be laudable, as it nour-
ishes the solidarity and civic spirit that helps to moderate or stabilize
political life through times of stress.
Sometimes commentators resolve the contradiction by resorting to a
different term—“patriotism”—when they want to capture the benevolent
dimension of “nationalism.” Raj Bhala is only the most recent example.21
George Orwell insisted on that distinction in an essay he published in
1945.22 At the time, monstrous evils unleashed by German nationalism still
concentrated the world’s attention, while everyone praised the nobility of
resistance to it, even though that resistance was often fueled by the resis-
tors’ own national feeling. Orwell characterized the latter as a “patriotism,”
not on grounds that it was more rational or generous but merely that it was
not expansionist or aggressive. But he realized that once “nationalism” is
defined as political aggression, the phenomenon has no necessary connec-
tion to nations. So Orwell acknowledged that Trotskyites, Catholics, and
other advocates focused exclusively on what would help their project could
be seen as displaying a kind of “nationalism.”23
For present purposes, it might be sufficient to define “nationalism” as
love of one’s nation and then leave open the possibility that the passion can
often resemble the jealous passion of Othello, who “lov’d not wisely but too
20. For articles on these terms, see MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
21. See generally Raj Bhala, Combatting Nationalism by Applying Catholic Teaching and
Studying Iran’s Constitution, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521–610 (2021).
22. 3 GEORGE ORWELL, THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE
ORWELL 362–63 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).
23. Id.
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well.”24 Nationalism can inspire resistance to foreign occupiers but also
hostility to neighboring states where people of the same ethnic or linguistic
community are “occupied” by the neighboring majority. It can inspire fel-
low feeling and mutual support among fellow nationals—and antipathy to
local minorities, as an alien presence of questionable loyalty.
Through most of the nineteenth century, nationalism was applauded by
liberals as a reaction to oppressive empires and a grounding for popular
(that is, democratic) government.25 Following the First World War, it was
often blamed for conflicts stirred by localized jealousies. Nationalism was
blamed for fomenting conflict between the sovereignty of existing political
entities and the national aspirations of submerged or scattered peoples. The
most notable example was Hitler’s demand that the border regions of
Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland) be ceded to Germany because the major-
ity of the regions’ inhabitants were of German ancestry or regarded German
as their native tongue.
If we ask whether nationalism has been a powerful force in recent
decades, the answer must be that, compared with claims of sovereignty,
nationalism has been remarkably contained. One of the most notable facts
about the world since 1945 is that national boundaries have rarely been
changed. That is true even for new nations, which have almost everywhere
retained the boundaries of the colonies from which they emerged. It is al-
most a metaphor for sovereignty: the abstraction of ruling authority remains
the same, even as content (“national” content!) changes.
So, for example, in the 1960s, champions of Arab nationalism cele-
brated the attempted joining of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq into the United Arab
Republic. Not only did the component states soon revert to independent
status but each retained its original borders—though they had originally
been drawn by European powers at the end of the First World War with
scarcely any regard for local feeling.26 Even foreign invasions and civil
wars of intense destructiveness in the twenty-first century left Syria and
Iraq with the same borders. One can tell the same story about carnage in
wars that spilled over borders in Central Africa in the 1990s: after vast
devastation, each state retained the borders assigned by European colonial
powers a century before.
24. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 5 sc. 2, l. 65 (Norman Sanders ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2018) (1622).
25. “[I]t is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of govern-
ments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.” JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERA-
TIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 347 (1861).
26. On drawing of original boundaries—in reaction to protests and pressures from various
European powers but with almost no regard to wishes of the inhabitants—see DAVID FROMKIN, A
PEACE TO END ALL PEACE 515–67 (1989); on hopes for Arab unification, culminating in abortive
construction of “United Arab Republic,” see ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES
401–15 (1991).
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It is often asserted that resistance to the European Union is fueled by
nationalism, and in particular that “nationalism” produced Brexit. But one
could say with equal plausibility—and perhaps more precision—that resis-
tance to supranational authority reflects a mounting concern with protecting
sovereignty, which may or may not tap deep nationalist feeling.27
There has certainly been national feeling for entities that are not sover-
eign. The interesting thing is that very few have succeeded since the
breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (which were artificial dictator-
ships) and Czechoslovakia (ruled by Communist dictatorship for decades
before the breakup of its component parts). The UK has left the EU, but
Scotland voted not to leave the UK. Nor has Catalonia broken away from
Spain, nor Quebec from Canada. Where votes are decisive, there has not
been a successful independence movement.
In some places, people of the same national origin have become dis-
persed across international boundaries. Many migrants from Mexico now
live in the southwestern states of the United States. Many migrants from the
United States now live in the western provinces of Canada. Still, the host
countries have not had to contend with serious social movements urging the
reconfiguration of borders. A contiguous belt of Kurdish populations in the
Middle East (stretching through Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) aspires to
independent statehood and might have been expected to earn sympathy
through pro-Western political alignments in the wars besetting that region.
But no outside state has ventured to endorse redrawing of regional borders
to accommodate a separate state for Kurds.
We have, to be sure, seen efforts in Europe (and elsewhere) to revive
the significance of borders by imposing new controls on the entrance of
foreign nationals and foreign goods. Again, this might be blamed on nation-
alism but could equally be seen as a concern to revive or defend national
sovereignty. No state has imposed new ethno-national controls on immigra-
tion—reserving citizenship for people of particular ancestry (as in White
Australia or US policy before 1965).28 Even the Trump administration en-
ded up imposing travel controls framed not as a ban on “Muslims” (as can-
didate Trump sometimes promised in his loose campaign rhetoric) but as
27. See, e.g., Daniel Hannan, The Six Best Reasons to Vote Leave, SPECTATOR, June 11,
2016, at 1 (on the eve of the referendum by which U.K. voters decided they want to leave the EU).
28. For origins of racial exclusion in Australian immigration policy (before the 1970s—the
so-called “White Australia” policy), see MARK PEEL & CHRISTINA TWOMEY, A HISTORY OF AUS-
TRALIA 109–10, 140–47 (2011). For a very detailed account of racial/ethnic limitations in US
immigration and naturalization policy even before the 1924 immigration act, see ROGERS M.
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS (1997). In the contemporary world, Israel gives preferential treatment to
immigrants of Jewish ancestry and Germany to immigrants of German ancestry, but both policies
have been in place since the establishment of these states in the late 1940s, when they opened their
doors to refugees of shared ancestry. These policies are not a response to any supposed recent
trend toward stronger nationalist feeling. For a survey of somewhat similar policies in other de-
mocracies—none very recent, see Steven Menashi, Ethnonationalism and Liberal Democracy, 32
U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 57 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 10  9-NOV-21 11:42
620 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
restrictions on entry from a small number of particular countries, already
designated (by the previous administration) as countries sponsoring terror-
ism (and not all of them majority Muslim). For all Trump’s initial dema-
gogic impulse, the issue did not strike him or his advisors as having long-
term appeal in swaying public opinion.
Similarly, there has been much protest against economic “globaliza-
tion,” blamed for undermining local producers of goods. Populist critics
have taken aim at the World Trade Organization for limiting the capacity of
governments to restrict imports or subsidize local producers. Protests
against competition from foreign-made goods are, in effect, demanding
stronger economic boundaries—against the world in general.
What we have not seen—at least on any large scale—are efforts to
mobilize consumers to boycott imports from particular countries denounced
as specially threatening or offensive to the community called to retaliate
with the boycott. Protest boycotts have certainly proved consequential in
the past: the movement to independence in eighteenth-century America ini-
tially mobilized public support with a boycott of British-supplied tea and
then of all other British exports to America.29 But in today’s world, boycott
movements have rarely been sustained or consequential. Trade restrictions
are instruments of state policy rather than of popular mobilization—acts of
sovereignty rather than expressions of nationalism.
III. RESTRAINING NATIONALISM
If it is true, as the preceding section suggests, that sovereignty has had
more momentum in recent decades than “nationalism” per se, we might
wonder about the relation between them. Perhaps they are not simply ex-
pressions of the same impulse but related in more complex ways, some-
times even in a reciprocal sense, such that strengthening of the one may
reduce the other.
One plausible reason to think so is that sovereignty is fundamentally
an institution while nationalism is a passion or mood. In the late nineteenth
century, the French historian Ernest Renan said, “A nation is a daily plebi-
scite”30—it depends on how people feel about it day by day. The whole
point of a sovereign state is to keep wheels turning, laws enforced, services
delivered, and defenses maintained, whether people “feel” this is what they
want on any particular day or not.
Whereas a sovereign state keeps itself in motion, national feeling in
the populace has to be mobilized. A national community can sometimes
endure without an independent state to protect it. But in the modern world,
29. For a recent account emphasizing social mobilization, see MARY BETH NORTON, 1774:
THE LONG YEAR OF REVOLUTION (2020).
30. ERNEST RENAN, What Is a Nation?, in WHAT IS A NATION? AND OTHER POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 247, 262 (Columbia Univ. Press 2018) (1882).
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statehood has usually been the aim of self-conscious national communities.
National communities usually do seek their own state and seek to remove
outside control where it exists. In a word, they seek sovereignty.
In the nature of what it is, this nationalist quest for independence may
inspire political protest and ongoing advocacy. But if it aims at sovereignty,
the intensity of political agitation tends to dissipate when that aim is
achieved. German nationalism was not satisfied with overturning the limita-
tions (in territory and military rearmament) imposed by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles after the First World War. The Nazi dictatorship reversed those
limits and then pursued wider conquests. But, after all, it was a dictatorship.
We certainly have grounds to doubt that, if Germany had a democratically
accountable government in 1939, that government would have had the con-
fidence even to launch the invasion of Poland in 1939, let alone the wider
aggressions that brought ultimate ruin to Germany.31
The French counterexample is more telling. During the Second World
War—or at least, following indications that eventual Allied victory was
likely—all shades of French opinion supported the recovery of national
sovereignty. That did not mean “nationalism” could keep French voters fo-
cused on a shared agenda thereafter. In 1947, Charles de Gaulle tried to
supplant party politics with what he called the “Rally of the French People”
(Rassemblement du Peuple Francais) rather than a party with a more fo-
cused agenda. It did not prevent other parties from resisting de Gaulle’s
agenda, nor from committing France to European institutions (ultimately
including the Common Market, forerunner of the EU), of which Gaullist
nationalism remained suspicious.32 Nationalist war leaders saw their parties
rejected by voters in many postwar democracies, notably Churchill’s Con-
servatives in Britain and Roosevelt’s Democrats (in the first postwar con-
gressional elections).33
31. See RICHARD OVERY, WHY THE ALLIES WON 298 (1995) (surveying evidence that
“[a]ggressive war was not a popular choice” among Germans in 1939, so they responded to the
outbreak of war not with enthusiasm but indications of “depression”).
32. De Gaulle’s postwar memoirs distinguished the grateful loyalty of the people at large
from the schemes of party leaders—without explaining where the latter got their votes: “I had
enjoyed [immediately after the war] the massive support of popular opinion. By contrast, the
various political, social and economic interest groups which had rapidly returned to the limelight
were very lukewarm in their approval. No sooner had the enemy departed than they bombarded
me with a multiplicity of recriminations of every sort and on every subject.” CHARLES DE GAULLE,
MEMOIRS OF HOPE: RENEWAL AND ENDEAVOR 5 (Terence Kilmartin trans., Simon & Schuster
1971) (1970).
33. In the British General Election of 1945, “the spirit was more sober [compared with the
election after World War I] and focused more precisely on housing and health, full employment
and industrial regeneration, on post-war social imperatives. . . . In this sense, the power and
prestige of Winston Churchill, the revered war leader, were an irrelevance.” Kenneth O. Morgan,
The Twentieth Century (1914–1984), in OXFORD HISTORY OF BRITAIN 523, 567 (Kenneth O. Mor-
gan ed., 1984). The 1946 American congressional elections saw Republicans earn a record high
percentage of votes for House seats (the highest between 1928 and 1988) by focusing on domestic
economic concerns: “‘Had enough?’ was the Republican slogan in 1946. Enough strikes, enough
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The point is not so much the sequence: first, nationalist mobilization;
then, restoration of sovereignty (or securing of independence) . . . finally,
popular distraction. Sovereignty may be an inherently moderating force.
Sovereignty as an institution has somewhat the relation to nationalist pas-
sion that property has to acquisitiveness (the passion for wealth). Most peo-
ple, at some times, long for coveted delicacies they cannot yet acquire (or
acquire on the scale they dream about). But appetites are personal. To think
of what we already own as property is to think of it as part of a system in
which what is ours by law corresponds to what by law belongs to others. To
think this way is to accept limits for the sake of security. To think of sover-
eignty is to think of a system in which various states can also make claims
to sovereignty. It is to think in ways that are self-limiting. Sovereignty in
that way may encourage limits on nationalist thinking.
Ultimately, the most important point is not a reduction in the intensity
of feeling but a change in focus. One could think of sovereignty as bearing
the same relation to national feeling that marriage does to romantic or erotic
feeling. It is quite possible to have a sovereign authority that exerts its au-
thority over people of many different nationalities (in the emotive or ethno-
graphic rather than the strictly legal or political sense of the “nationality”).
Over the course of history, such agglomerations were often acquired by
dynastic marriages that united territories without necessarily inspiring great
love between the original marriage partners, let alone their respective peo-
ples. But even couples who come together in romance often find them-
selves, in later years, more focused on children and mortgage payments.
They are no longer merely a couple but the core of a household and a fam-
ily. You might see the transition as a sad cooling of ardor. But you might
rather see it as transforming impulses of passion into a more reasonable or
more durable expression.
Nationalism appeals to “the nation” as if it were a natural or preexist-
ing community. Like lovers, nationalists want to say, “We were destined to
be together.” But a couple is a community of two, who can be enshrined
forever in one photograph. A nation is multitudinous. So nationalism has
always faced the challenge of determining who belongs in the grouping it
regards as “the nation.” Is it a community of common ancestry? Common
language? Common religion? Common enemies?
History has often thrown people under the same political authority
who do not share these commonalities. Rulers have often exerted much ef-
fort to coerce people to adopt the approved language (or the standardized
version of it) along with the approved national religion. They have often
discovered that this foments division rather than unity. Renan pointed out
that to feel French, it was necessary to forget the tribal divisions (Francs,
meatless days, enough wage and price controls . . . [e]nough inflation, enough high taxes, enough
coddling of unions.” MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY 187–88 (1990).
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Alans, Burgundians) that preceded French nationality and to forget the per-
secutions imposed by centralizing rulers (like the massacre of Protestants
during the Reformation or of Catholics during the Revolution).
For a people to maintain a sense of shared nationality, it is not enough
that they embrace a sense of commonality. They may also have to adjust to
their differences. That may require the sort of forgiving and forgetting that
marriage counselors urge to maintain a marriage and a family.
CONCLUSION
To return to the initial question: the mood of opposition to transna-
tional governing structures has resonance on both the left and the right. The
Left has long protested trade agreements that (so critics claim) undermine
protections for workers (and for consumers and the natural environment) at
home. Long before rioters broke windows in Seattle to demonstrate “antira-
cism,” they did so to demonstrate anti-free-trade feeling during the Seattle
meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999. The Left takes for
granted that foreign wars are bad, even if undertaken with allies or on be-
half of allies. There are counterpart sentiments among many nationalists
now thought of as being on the right. But the novelty of candidate Donald
Trump (and the key to his initial success) was his capacity to draw voters,
such as factory workers in Midwest states, who had previously voted for
Barack Obama and local Democrats. As the new Conservative Party leader,
Boris Johnson won support in districts in Britain that had supported the
Labour Party for many decades, partly because his support for British with-
drawal from the EU had broad support in the English Midlands.
Despite such overlapping inclinations, politics in many countries now
seems intensely polarized, even tribalistic in the intensity of distrust that
particular subgroups feel for others. There may be no simple cure for this
condition. But where nationalism often divides—because it is an appeal of
“us” against “them”—an emphasis on national sovereignty can be a re-
straining force. Do we want to be one country, sharing a common govern-
ment—or break apart?
In a world of tumult, sovereignty cannot be taken for granted. Perhaps
it would be safer to entrust more authority to transnational organizations to
protect trade flows, human rights, environmental standards, and security
against rogue states or would-be aggressors. A nation that insists on its right
to decide for itself must first maintain the capacity to make decisions or to
sustain a political authority it trusts to make decisions.
All that requires that people within a country learn to be more trusting
of each other. Today, that looks like a very hard challenge! It may be
human nature to be more trusting of those we see as most like ourselves—
to be tribal. Early theorists of sovereignty recognized that in a democracy,
sovereign power would be held by the citizenry at large, but only if they
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were capable of acting together. Whether we are capable of that may seem
in doubt when protestors battle police and try to deface or tear down na-
tional monuments. But the logic of sovereignty points away from racial
divisions: “In the eyes of government, we are just one race . . . It is Ameri-
can.”34 Trying to maintain a common government may be a unifying effort.
It aims at structure, law, stability—good things, especially where more in-
tense passions threaten brutal conflict.
34. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
